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ABSTRACT
As science and technology are increasingly at the center of global issues, diplomats are less capable of
effectively completing their work without heavily relying on scientists and engineers for clarification
and insight. This thesis is motivated by a desire to determine if convincing evidence exists that the
lack of diplomats' technical knowledge and/or existing relational difficulties between the diplomat
and the technical expert have negative effects on international agreements.
The first required step, the focus of this thesis, is to gain an understanding of the technical expert
and the diplomat's relationship. This thesis has examined, as a case study, the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration Office of External Relations' (OER) diplomats - officially known as
international program specialists (IPS). The IPSs were interviewed and the data was analyzed using
the grounded theory coding process. Statistics and charts were produced from pre-interview ques-
tionnaires and competency data and used as supporting evidence for the interview data. The thesis
question is expressed and answered through its three sub-questions: What is the IPS's working
relationship with scientists and engineers? How do IPSs go about writing the technical content of
agreements? What is the IPS' technical competence? The collective answer is that an IPS does not
generate the technical content of agreements, but relies heavily on the technical expert for both the
content and its clarification. This lack of technical competence is supported by the fact that only
1% of reported OER's employees' competencies are technical (hard math and science) and only 4%
are technically related.
Additionally, hypotheses were drawn: An evaluation of the current IPS orientation process and
OER training procedures may show that, despite perceived difficulties, the practices are the best
available; An increased understanding of the IPS's role, on behalf of the technical experts - especially
the field experts, should improve the relationship between the IPS and the technical expert; The
technical competence of an IPS is, to some degree, dependent on both (1) the working relationship
an IPS has with the technical expert and (2) the IPS' capability, capacity, and desire to learn. The
study largely implies that the lack of understanding of the diplomat's role may also be apparent
in other technical organizations where the method of diplomacy aiding science and technology is
practiced.
Thesis Supervisor: Jeffrey Hoffman, Ph.D.
Title: Professor of the Practice, Aeronautics and Astronautics
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The American Science and Technology Diplomacy Workforce
In the early years after the founding of the United States, science and technology were closely tied
to American diplomacy. The first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, administered the Nation's
first patent law and helped to establish a bureau of weights and measures that was associated with
the Department of State. Eventually this close relationship between diplomats and scientists would
diminish, but science and technology would regain a prominent role in the State Department during
World War II [1].
Today, in addition to the United States Department of State (DOS), the American S&T diplomacy
workforce is comprised of the White House, a number of cabinet-level and independent federal
agencies, and congressional committees. The White House has advisory groups that help guide the
President on science and technology issues. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP),
established by the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of
1976, was created to advise the President on domestic and international S&T issues, policies, and
cooperation. Two other advisory groups, both administered by OSTP, are the National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC) and the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST). NSTC is the principal Cabinet-level means to coordinate science and technology policy
across the diverse entities that make up the federal research and development enterprise. PCAST
is an advisory group of the nation's leading scientists and engineers who directly advise the Pres-
ident and the Executive Office of the President by making policy recommendations in the many
areas where understanding of science, technology, and innovation is key to strengthening the U.S.
economy and forming policy that works for the American people [2}.
The DOS sets the overall policy direction for diplomacy and is the lead federal agency in de-
veloping S&T agreements. The DOS sets its policy direction using the diplomatic perspective of
American leadership in science and technology as used to enhance another country's development
and to improve understanding by other nationals of U.S. values and ways of doing business. The
DOS Bureau of Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Office
of Science and Technology Cooperation (OES/STC), coordinates international S&T cooperative
activities throughout the federal government 131.
A number of independent federal agencies are also involved in international S&T policy. About
40 U.S. government departments and agencies have bilateral and regional programs involving devel-
oping countries, and S&T are prominent themes in many of these programs [4]. These include, but
are not limited to, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Science Foun-
dation (NSF), National Institutes of Health (NIH), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of
Agriculture (DOA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) [3}.
USAID, playing a big role in sustainable international development, receives foreign policy guid-
ance from the Secretary of State - a position currently held by Hillary Rodham Clinton. USAID,
desiring to provide a better future for all, supports long-term growth and advances in U.S. foreign
policy objectives by supporting agriculture, democracy & governance, economic growth, the envi-
ronment, education, health, global partnerships/conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance in
more than 100 countries [5].
The United States Congress has two science and technology committees: the Senate's Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Science
and Technology. The Senate's Committee is responsible for the regulation of consumer products and
services. The Committee is also in charge of the nation's science, engineering, and technology policy.
This encompasses the jurisdiction over non-military aeronautical and space science policy includ-
ing surrounding transportation issues. The Committee comprises seven subcommittees: Aviation
Operations, Safety, & Security; Communications, Technology, and the Internet; Competitiveness,
Innovation, and Export Promotion; Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance; Oceans,
Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard; Science and Space; and Surface Transportation and Mer-
chant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security. The House of Representatives Committee on
Science and Technology also plays an important role in much of the legislation Congress considers
in domestic and international science, technology, standards and competitiveness. The Committee
has jurisdiction over the exploration of outer space, astronautical research and development, scien-
tific research and development, and science scholarships, legislation relating to scientific agencies,
and legislation related to the atmosphere, the National Weather Service, civil aviation research and
development, energy, and the environment. The Committee comprises five subcommittees: Energy
& Environment; Technology & Innovation; Research & Science Education; Space & Aeronautics:
and Investigations & Oversight.
Thesis Motivation and Formation
The White House advisory groups and the independent federal agencies provide the majority of the
technical expertise within the American S&T diplomacy workforce, while congressional members,
even with its large share of jurisdiction over American S&T diplomacy, lack technical expertise.
As shown in Table 1, of the congressional members of the Science Committees, 1 out of the 25
Senators and 9 out of the 41 House Representatives has obtained a degree in some sort of hard
math or science field. To assist in the matter, these congressmen have staff members with technical
backgrounds; however, only about 9 out of 76 Senate Science Committee staff members and about
12 out of the 36 House Science Committee staff members have technical backgrounds [6, 7]. Due
to legislative objectives, this lack of technical expertise is expected among congressional members;
however, it may not be expected within a technical independent agency such as NASA.
Table 1: Members of the Congressional Science Committees: Senate's Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy [6, 7].
Congress Member Profession/Degree
Sen. John Ensign Veterinarian
Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson Nurse
Rep. David Wu Medical Degree
Rep. Brian Baird Clinical Psychology
Rep. Dan Lipinski Mechanical Engineering
Rep. Paul Tonko Mechanical/Industrial Engineering
Rep. Roscoe Bartlett Anatomy, Physiology, and Zoology
Rep. Vern Ehlers Nuclear Physics
Rep. Todd Akin Management Engineering
Rep. Paul Broun Chemistry, Medical Doctor
NASA's Office of External Relations (OER) is responsible for establishing NASA's cooperative
agreements and setting NASA's international relation strategies. OER's diplomats, who write the
agreements, are formally known as international program specialists (IPS). Cooperation, legalized
by agreements, includes working with both domestic and international entities, such as other space
agencies, foreign governments, federal agencies, companies, universities, and national labs. OER's
organization directly reflects NASA's mission directorates: Science, Exploration Systems, Aeronau-
tics Research, and Space Operations. As a support office for NASA, OER is organized to reflect
the four NASA mission directorates; although not entirely. OER has three divisions whose purpose
is mission directorate support: Science, Exploration Systems and Aeronautics Research, and Space
Operations. The cooperative agreements produced reflect the work of the mission directorate. For
example, in the Aeronautics Mission Directorate an agreement may consist of NASA allowing the
European Space Agency (ESA) to use a NASA airplane for the employment of a telescope during
flight to conduct space research.
As an intern at OER the summer of 2009, it was observed that an IPS supports and represents
NASA, serves the mission directorates, and serves as a link between the mission directorates and
its programs. However, it was also observed that an IPS does not have a technical background,
and new IPS employees are not offered an official OER, orientation program. This fact raised ques-
tions. Without a formal technical education and orientation program, are IPSs tasked with writing
agreements consisting of content they do not understand? If not, then how is it that new IPSs are
efficiently negotiating agreements on NASA's behalf? The average IPS, before OER employment,
did not know much about NASA, its organization, its history, or its mission. Even if aware, there
were technical processes and phrases that are particular to NASA's mission directorates and orga-
nizations that needed to be learned.
In spite of these observations, NASA is obviously a thriving force for American S&T diplomacy,
collaborating with many nations on an a range of activities, such as satellite and human exploration
missions. In order to be such a thriving force, NASA OER's conduction of diplomacy is obviously
working, and because of the IPS' lack of technical expertise, there must be heavy interaction be-
tween the IPS and the technical expert. Therefore, one can conclude that technical expertise used
for American S&T diplomacy is solely provided by technical experts.
However, this reliance on technical expertise is not specific to American S&T diplomacy. As science
and technology are increasingly at the center of global issues, diplomats - who generally lack tech-
nical backgrounds - are less capable of effectively completing their work without having to heavily
rely on scientists and engineers for clarification and insight. Therefore, the efficiency of a diplomat's
work depends in large part on the efficiency of the diplomat's working relationship with scientists
and engineers.
Using this as motivation, there is a need to examine the relationship between to diplomat and
the technical expert to determine if implications of negative affects on international agreements
exist. The first step towards this goal is to gain an understanding of the diplomat's technical com-
petencies and abilities. There is also a need to examine the relationship between the technical
expert and the diplomat to determine how the expertise is provided.
This is accomplished by using NASA OER as a case study to answer the following question and
sub-questions: What are the technical interactions of international program specialists at NASA's
Office of External Relations?
9 What is their working relationship with scientists and engineers?
9 How do they go about writing the technical content of agreements?
What is their technical competence (is it really non-technical)?
The answers will help to define OER's diplomatic processes and interactions with technical experts.
Thesis Structure
The thesis is organized strategically and logically to present the answers to the proposed questions.
The next chapter, the literature review, will present an overview of the field of diplomacy involving
science and technology. Chapter 3 will (1) present the research study design, (2) define the data
needed for collection, and (3) identify the procedures for collection, analysis, and validation. Chapter
4 presents the study results and hypotheses, which are are discussed in Chapter 5. The thesis
concludes with Chapter 6. Here the study is summarized and the study's contributions are presented.
The study's limitations and future work are also discussed in Chapter 6.
20
CHAPTER 2: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND DIPLOMACY
An overview of the field of diplomacy involving science and technology is presented in this chapter.
The review of current research and methods only includes the sources best considered for their
argument, most convincing of their opinions, and making the greatest contribution to the under-
standing and development of their area of research. The chapter concludes with a presentation of
the proposed study.
Diplomacy is a political means, employing the art of negotiation, in which states pursue foreign
activities 191. Science and technology is a diverse and enormously inter-disciplined area within the
field of diplomacy because all entities of science and technology are represented. Scientific and
technological research includes a widely diverse set of issues, methods, schools of thought, implica-
tions, et cetera. Research areas can span from cell phone and laptop recycling to outer space debris
clean-up to climate change. Varying degrees of scientific input is needed for science-based activi-
ties conducted by international agencies. Such activities include, creating policy, setting standards,
conducting assessments, and monitoring and researching scientific phenomenon.
Literature identifies two major methods in which science and technology are represented in diplo-
macy: the method of science and technology aiding diplomacy and the method of diplomacy aiding
science and technology. The method of science aiding diplomacy, where science includes engineer-
ing, technology, the social sciences, health, agriculture, is the inclusion of scientific knowledge in the
international diplomacy decision making process [10]. There is extensive literature on this method.
The major source of information on science aiding diplomacy is the Knowledge and Diplomacy:
Science Advice in the United Nations System written by the National Research Council's (NRC)
Committee for Survey and Analysis of Science Advice on Sustainable Development to International
Organizations [10]. The NRC's study highlights the inherent difficulty of using credible scientific
knowledge to influence the political process of diplomacy.
The method of diplomacy aiding science and technology is the use of diplomatic processes to es-
tablish or further science and technology collaboration. An extensive literature search yielded no
empirical studies on this method. Therefore to find out more about how America conducts its inter-
national science and technology policy collaboration, the U.S. Department of State's (DOS) public
documents were searched. The DOS, as head of all American foreign activities and policies, has a
set of procedures for international science and technology cooperative agreements. Understanding
this process will help to shine light on how the method of diplomacy aiding science and technology
is conducted in America.
Science and Technology Aiding Diplomacy
Literature is clear that the method of science and technology aiding diplomacy has its inefficiencies.
Science searches for truth through means that conflict with politics [11]. As Weingart [121 states in
his 1999 Science and Public Policy journal article:
Two paradoxes form the nucleus of the problems of scientific expertise and policy-making.
The first is the simultaneous scientification of politics and the politicisation of science.
This has destructive effects: the increased use of scientific expertise by policy-makers
has not increased the degree of certainty, in fact it becomes de-legitimating. This gives
rise to the second paradox: despite the loss of authority of scientific expertise, policy-
makers do not abandon their reliance on existing advisory arrangements, nor do the
scholars adapt their ideas on science and its relation to politics. How can this stability
be achieved? How can science-politics be institutionalised? [12]
The body of scientific knowledge evolves with time through experiment, discovery, and new theoret-
ical ideas. The scientific community places great pride in peer review, where research or recommen-
dations of a group of scientists are reviewed and criticized, usually anonymously by other scientists
of equal expertise and standing. The original group is then expected to respond to the their crit-
icisms. These processes, which are intended to embody expertise, independence, and objectivity,
ensure what is known as scientific credibility, where bias and conflicts of interest are eliminated or
balanced [101. On the other hand, political processes rest on different foundations. The political
organizations are representative bodies, and use the interplay of the interests of constituents and
stakeholders for decision making. Expertise is frequently given less weight than balance of interests.
This is the opposite of the independence prized by scientists. In advisory bodies, weight is also
given to geographical, economic, and even religious balance [10].
However, in spite of this oil-water type of relationship that science and politics have, the avail-
ability of quality scientific input for science-based decision making by the international diplomacy
community (governing bodies, governments, and the UN) is necessary. Over the decades, the UN
has focused on geographical representation with little concern for scientific credibility. For exam-
ple, most scientists work in the Western industrialized countries and Japan. A recruitment of the
world's best experts in many technical areas will result in an expert group with a majority of Vest-
erners; such a body is given little credence with the UN system [101. As a result of such issues, the
National Research Council (NRC) conducted a study that surveyed and analyzed the institutional
arrangements for science advice to international agencies specific to those involved in international
sustainable development. The study focused on improving science advice in the area of sustainable
development because "the global environmental movement has been an important source of expe-
rience on the use of science advice in international diplomacy [10]." The study's purpose was to
evaluate the quality and effectiveness of the UN's science advice procedures and recommend ways
to improve the scientific input.
The NRC originally asked the following questions:
" How is scientific information sought and utilized by international, multilateral and bilateral
organizations in the following areas: energy, freshwater quality and use, oceans, and fisheries?
" What is the role of existing scientific bodies, governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovern-
mental, in providing such information?
" To what extent does the scientific information come from peer-reviewed and independent
sources, and how open is the process?
However, after initial research, the NRC realized that these questions did not have simple answers.
The initial research yielded an overwhelming amount of examples of science advice in the UN's bod-
ies; however, the number of examples lacked apparent patterns or quality standards or evaluation
procedures. The Committee decided that in order to make a valuable contribution it was best to
examine established science advice mechanisms outside of the UN system. This would allow for the
extraction of a set of principles that would be useful for assessing the mechanisms and processes
within the system 110].
To obtain information for the study, a qualitative research method was used. The UN operates
through a wide range of organs including the General Assembly, commissions, programs, research
institutes, agencies, treaty bodies, forums, and conferences [10]. Science advisory mechanisms of one
sort or another are found throughout the system. Some of these organizations and affiliate organi-
zations were emailed questionnaires requesting information regarding procedures they had adopted
for developing science advice. The organizations questioned were the Inter-Academy Council (IAC),
the Council of Academies of Engineering and Technological Sciences (CAETS), the Third World
Academy of Sciences (TWAS), the European Council of Applied Sciences and Engineering (Euro-
CASE), and the UK Royal Academy of Engineering (UKRAE). The procedures reported found to
be consistent. They consisted of the following process: knowing when science advice is needed,
stating the science advisory task, identification and recruitment of a study committee, balance of
regions, disciplines, and views, management of bias and conflict, management of data and role of
staff, drafting a report consisting of the science advice, report consensus and dissent, report review,
choice of delivery of advice, implications of the process, and follow-up and impact. Best practices
and insights were also presented with the synthesized procedure reporting from the organizations
questioned. The NRC in turn used the procedures as a foundation upon which to assess the role of
the science advice in the United Nations system [10].
Outside of findings specific to the UN, the study concluded that:
9 The real task of the science advisor is to serve as an intermediary to engage the broad scientific
community in the service of the organization or the decision maker.
9 The participation of the science advisor can make the difference between successful use of
science and the failure of an action because of scientific constraints.
9 Best known experts with experience on expert committees providing science advice in most
fields is likely to find more candidates from the industrialized countries and few from developing
nations. Such a politically incorrect imbalance could affect the legitimacy of science advice
provided by such groups.
e It is easier to improve the functioning of science advice while enhancing scientific credibility by
broadening the input base and introducing or strengthening the peer review processes than by
just promoting interactions between science and policy while maintaining scientific credibility.
The most significant finding of the study is that science advice mechanisms function most effectively
where a balance between scientific credibility and policy involvement has been achieved. Weingart,
on the other hand, believes that the interacting mechanisms, which constitute the coupling of science
and politics, will never come to a stable state and that the boundary between science and politics
has to be constantly redrawn and reiterated [12].
Diplomacy Aiding Science and Technology
With no research conducted in the area of diplomacy aiding science and technology, the DOS' doc-
uments were searched. The DOS has a established the "Circular 175 (C-175) procedure," which
"seeks to confirm that the making of treaties and other international agreements by the United
States is carried out within constitutional and other legal limitations, with due consideration of the
agreement's foreign policy implications, and with appropriate involvement by the State Department
[13]." The C-175 process allows for the DOS to coordinate and oversee major science and technology
agreements and activities between the United States and foreign entities. An international agree-
ment may not be signed or concluded on behalf of the U.S. government without prior consultation
with the Secretary of State [14].
The process begins when the originating agency determines that a cooperative activity with a foreign
government entity is desirable or necessary. The agency then drafts an agreement and conducts an
internal review and clearance process, including review by its general counsel or legal adviser. Part
of the review should include a determination of whether the agency wishes the text to be legally
binding under international law [14]. After the internal review is conducted, the government agency
will submit a C-175 request or an action in memorandum form to the State Department seeking
authority to negotiate, conclude, amend, extend, or terminate an international agreement [13].
A Circular 175 memorandum will generally address the following issues [13]:
" The proposed agreement's principal features, indicating any special problems that may be
encountered and, if possible, the contemplated solutions to those problems;
" The policy benefits to the United States, as well as potential risks;
" Whether congressional consultations on the agreement have been or will be undertaken;
* The funding sources that will be committed by execution of the proposed agreement;
" Whether the proposed agreement reasonably could be expected to have a significant regulatory
impact on domestic entities or persons; and
" The environmental impact that may arise as a result of the agreement.
Each Circular 175 memorandum is accompanied by a separate Memorandum of Law, prepared by
the Office of the Legal Adviser. This legal memorandum generally will include [131:
" A discussion and justification of the designation given to the proposed agreement (treaty vs.
executive agreement);
" An explanation of the legal authority for negotiating and/or concluding the proposed agree-
ment, including an analysis of the Constitutional powers relied upon as well as any pertinent
legislation;
* An analysis of the issues surrounding the agreement's implementation as a matter of domestic
law (e.g., whether the agreement is self-executing, whether domestic implementing legislation
or regulations will be necessary before or after the agreement's execution).
Upon receipt of the agency's draft agreement with supporting documents, the documents are first
logged into a register to acknowledge receipt and permit subsequent tracking. An action officer is
subsequently chosen to manage the proposed agreement through the C-175 inter-agency clearance
and authorization process [14]. While at the DOS, the request is passed through an inter-agency
review of the proposed agreement and bilateral memoranda of understanding is conducted.
Ultimately, the C-175 process only includes routine international science and technology agree-
ments, where "routine" refers to those agreements which do not have such significant budgetary,
legal, or political implications as to warrant extensive legal, political, or other high level review and
approval. The process is not designed to cover agreements related to defense or large multilateral
undertakings (e.g., the agreement covering the International Space Station) [14].
Proposed Study
It is apparent that very little is known about the method of diplomacy aiding science in comparison
to what is known about the method of science and technology aiding diplomacy. Any research con-
ducted to help fill this substantial knowledge gap must use a hypothesis-generating research method
because there is little or no prior knowledge of an area. In the literature search it was discovered that
science advice mechanisms function most effectively where a balance between scientific credibility
and policy involvement has been achieved. How would diplomatic advice function most effectively?
To answer this question, there is a primary need to understand the role that both diplomats and
technical experts play, and this is the proposed area of study for this thesis.
The purpose of this study is to employ the grounded theory, a qualitative method of the same
concept as the method used in the UN study, to explore and gain an understanding of the rela-
tionship that exists between the technical expert and the diplomat. This study is also looking to
understand the diplomat's technical competency. The National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion's Office of External Relations will be examined as a case study. The study has been narrowed
to the perspective of the diplomat written to address a technical audience.
It is hoped that the results of the study will include: insight into the method in which techni-
cal expertise is provided when diplomacy is aiding science and technology, information to help
better the communication and relationship between NASA's diplomats and technical experts, im-
plications of general diplomat-technical expert behavior to be tested, inspiration for diplomats and
technical experts to build better relationships for the sake of developing the best solutions to global
and societal issues.
Chapter Summary
This chapter has given a general overview of the topic of science and technology in diplomacy.
There are two major methods in which science and technology are represented in diplomacy: the
method of science and technology aiding diplomacy and the method of diplomacy aiding science
and technology. The method of science aiding diplomacy, supported by extensive research, is the in-
clusion of scientific knowledge in the international diplomacy decision making process. The method
of diplomacy aiding science, with no empirical study support, is the use of diplomatic processes
to establish or further science and technology collaboration. Even though it was discovered that
science advice mechanisms function most effectively where a balance between scientific credibility
and policy involvement has been achieved, science and politics will seem to always have an apparent
oil-water type of relationship due to the conflicting process to truth in their respected areas.
With no existing literature on the method of diplomacy aiding science, this study proposes to use
a hypothesis-generating method to help fill the knowledge gap. This study is specifically looking to
understand the technical interaction and the technical competence of NASA's diplomats, known as
international program specialists, to gain insight into the technical competencies and abilities of all
American diplomats and their working relationship with technical experts.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
The following chapter presents the research design used in answering the proposed research ques-
tions. There are three major sections. The data sources and the purpose for these sources are
provided in the first section. The second section provides the data analysis, including the method
of choice, and the analysis procedures. The third and final section finishes the chapter with an
explanation of the validity check for the study's methodology.
Data Sources
All research involving humans that is performed at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
is first reviewed and approved by Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects
(COUHES) before any data can be collected [15]. Therefore, prior to data collection, the author
required training, and the pre-interview and interview questions were approved.
Open interviews were chosen as a method of data collection to allow honest answers and insight.
The pre-interview and interview questions were designed to gain an understanding of the IPS' tech-
nical competencies, day-to-day technical interactions, and educational and training backgrounds.
The questionnaire requested information pertaining to educational training, on-the-job training,
and further education or schooling (see Appendix A for a sample of the pre-interview questions).
This questionnaire was issued to help cut down on the in-person interview time and to allow more
time for the interviewee to reflect on personal experiences. The interview questions were designed to
gain an understanding of the skills and abilities of the IPS's job, the interaction with the technical
content of the agreements, and real examples of technical challenges faced by the IPS in writing
agreements. There were three versions of interview questions; however, the third and final version
is shown in Appendix B. The changes were made as a result of the learning curve effect; the more
interviews conducted, the more poorly designed questions or poorly asked questions were recognized
and improved.
There are approximately 18 international program specialists and 3 mission support division di-
rectors in NASA OER. After gaining approval from OER management, an initial mass email was
sent to the IPSs requesting participation in the study. After a limited response, every IPS was
contacted directly via phone; inquiring directly about interest to participate in the study. Twelve
of the eighteen IPSs, and one of the three division directors agreed to participate. Upon agreement,
interview dates were arranged to be conducted in person, at separate times at NASA Headquarters
in Washington, D.C. Subsequently, a COUHES interview participation form and the pre-interview
questionnaire were emailed to each participant.
In order to supplement the data collected from interviews and to gain an understanding of the
IPSs' technical competencies, an anonymous competency list of OER's employees was provided by
NASA's Office of Human Capital Management (OHCM). OHCM uses a Competency Management
System (CMS), which is a collection of business processes and tools that are used to measure and
monitor the Agency's corporate knowledge base. The CMS is also used as a means of strategic hu-
man capital management, business processes integration, employee development, expertise locator,
knowledge management, and a communication tool. NASA's Human Resources define a compe-
tency as a conceptual representation of a body of knowledge. The competencies in the CMS are
used to categorize the capabilities of an employee, identify the knowledge requirements of a job po-
sition, forecast the workforce requirements for a project, and stimulate the interaction and sharing
of knowledge across the Agency. The CMS is not designed or used as an Agency employment and
selection system. When defining a job, competencies relate to, and can help define, the knowledge
requirements for the position. But there are several other qualifications factors (such a duties, skills,
abilities, location, job environment, etc.) that are defined and used during the competitive selection
process. Furthermore, the competencies of CMS are not used for pay setting, employee performance
evaluation, nor for determining task/work assignments [16].
Data Analysis
This thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Statistics and charts were pro-
duced using the pre-interview questionnaire and the competency data. The data are used as sup-
porting evidence to gain insight into and perspective on the interview data.
The qualitative research method of grounded theory, used to analyze the interview data, is a
hypothesis-generating research method originally developed by two sociologists, Barney Glaser and
Anselm Strauss [171. This method was chosen because there is little or no prior knowledge of an
area. As sources support, this research method is chosen when a researcher does not know enough
to state meaningful hypotheses or when subjective information is needed [181. Furthermore, it is
well noted that this research method is best suited for the type of research question that is related
to the interaction between "persons or among individuals and specific environments 1191."
The subjectivity of qualitative research is often dismissed as unreliable and irrelevant as compared
to the traditional objective scientific way of thinking. Qualitative research involves an inescapable
element of interpretation and is complementary to quantitative research despite what traditional-
ists may think. The main issue is that each researcher's interpretations must be transparent or
understandable to others." [18] Grounded theory excels at "teasing" out experiences by employing
two principles: (1) listening rather than measuring, and (2) generating hypotheses using theoretical
coding. Theoretical coding involves analyzing and interpreting texts and interviews in order to dis-
cover meaningful patterns descriptive of a particular phenomenon 1181. However, the fragmentation
of the data through coding can lead to a loss of the bigger picture [19]. According to Auerbach and
Silverstein [18], grounded theory coding consists of the following steps:
1. Summarize raw data (Raw Data).
2. Separate relevant data from the irrelevant data (Relevant Text).
3. Identify repeating ideas (Repeating Ideas).
4. Group the repeating ideas into themes (Themes).
5. Group the themes into theories, seeking literature to fill any knowledge gaps (Theoretical Con-
structs).
6. Express the theories as related to the study's research concerns developed in forms of narratives
(Theoretical Narratives).
This grounded theory coding process, which is consistent with open coding literature [171, ap-
pears to be contradictory to the purpose of the grounded theory method; the process yields theories
instead of hypotheses. However, the authors do acknowledge that hypotheses can also be drawn
during this process. Searching for the authors' definition of theory for clarification, it is discov-
ered that Auerbach and Silverstein are not particularly clear about their theory definition; but it
appears that their implication of the definition is what others in the field have defined as social the-
ory or "the use of abstract concepts to describe some aspects of social structure or social change [20]."
Social theory, however, is controversial. Slawski [20] argues that a concept, an abstraction ob-
served from a recurrence of some phenomenon, or classification of concepts cannot in itself explain
why a social structure exists. Nor can concepts alone explain change in the structure of relations
between people. At best, these can only give information to help to begin to explain what has
happened [20]. Only a hypothesis, the relationship between two or more concepts together in a
statement that tells us something about the casual relationship between the concepts, can begin to
explain why something has happened. When a set of hypotheses are put together in a deductive
interrelated way, a theory is formed [20]. Therefore, according to Slawski, Auerbach and Silver-
stein's coding process does not yield theories, but concepts and hypotheses. In turn, this study uses
Auerbach and Silverstein's coding process to derive concepts and hypotheses for further study, not
theories. Furthermore, because this thesis is of limited scope, generalization would not be possible
(even if deriving theories were the objective). A single case study cannot prove a general theory;
however, it can disprove a general theory.
Analysis Procedures
The interviews were either audio recorded or summarized by note-taking. Instead of transcribing
each of the audio recorded interviews, the information given for each question was summarized.
During this summary process, duplicate answers were combined to establish a more well-rounded
answer. Strauss and Corbin [171 supports this and states that the general rule of thumb is to tran-
scribe as much as needed, according to the particular demands of the research study. Transcribing
the first interviews conducted is helpful so that they can be analyzed before more interviews are
conducted [17].
The following are the altered Auerbach and Silverstein's grounded theory coding procedures that
were employed during this study:
1. Summarizing the raw data.
2. Separating the relevant data from the irrelevant data.
3. Identifying the repeating ideas.
4. Grouping the repeating ideas into themes.
5. Grouping the themes into theoretical constructs or hypotheses, and seeking literature to fill any
knowledge gaps.
6. Explicitly writing the hypotheses as related to the study's research concerns developed.
The raw text is the raw data supplied by the interviewees. This raw text is subsequently summa-
rized. Relevant data are data in line with research concerns. It is common in open-ended interviews
that interviewees tend to diverge from the question asked. This irrelevant data are to be discarded;
it is important. The irrelevant data is set aside to be addressed in Chapter 6 as the basis for future
research.
In forming the themes, the repeating ideas and the insightful ideas are complied into a list, in
no particular order. Next, the first listed repeating idea is used as the starter or anchor idea. The
anchor idea is removed from the list and is compared to each of the repeating and insightful ideas
on the list one by one. When an idea is found to be related to this anchor idea, it is removed
from the list as well and grouped with the anchor idea. The reasoning for its relation is also noted.
After each idea is compared to the anchor idea, the resulting group of extracted ideas form the first
theme and the similarities noted form the conceptual basis for the theme. This first round is now
finished. The next repeating idea on the list becomes the new anchor idea. It is removed from the
list and is compared to each of the remaining ideas. This new anchor is not compared the ideas
constituting the newly formed theme because the comparison was done in the first round. After
each idea is compared to the new anchor idea, the resulting group of extracted ideas form the second
theme and the similarities noted form the conceptual basis for the theme. This process continues
until all ideas are grouped into themes [181. This same process and logic is used in forming the
theoretical constructs in Step 5. The method of grouping the repeating ideas is left to the discretion
of the evaluator; therefore, the evaluator must be explicit about the biases, logical reasoning, and
theoretical framework that is used during the process. In this study, the research concerns and the
theoretical framework - Chapter 2 - provides the conceptual basis for the logical reasoning behind
the grouping of the repeating ideas.
In Step 6, the study's hypotheses are formally stated. The hypotheses are presented with liter-
ature support and research study design recommendations in Chapter 5.
Reliability and Validity
Reliability is the repeatability of the same phenomenon from one observer. Validity checks whether
or not the observer is actually observing the phenomenon stated to have been observed {20].
The reliability of the grounded theory coding process, as used in this study, is supported by the
evaluation of the raw data for repeating ideas in Step 1 of the process. The process' validity check
is in the comparison between the research concerns and the resulting hypotheses (see Figure 1).
The thesis questions are the research concerns. These research concerns become the themes of the
interview questions. The interview process presents inefficiencies in the interpretation of the ques-
tions asked and the interpretation of the answers given. Therefore the yielding raw data should not
be predictive. Next, this raw data are subjective answers that then become coded using the five
steps previously explained. After the subjective answers are coded, the resulting hypotheses are
conditionally related to the study's research concerns. This is done in the sixth step of the coding




















Figure 1: Visual Explanation of the Study's Grounded Theory Coding Process Validity
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the raw competency, pre-interview, and interview data. The results of the
grounded theory coding process of the interview data, which are hypotheses, are also presented at
the end of the chapter.
Competency Data
The competency data from NASA Headquarter's Office of Human Capital Management (OHCM)
provided an overall synopsis of the competency composition of NASA OER (everyone included
from the administrative assistants to the international program specialists). Of the CMS compe-
tency domains, there are two domains in which the competencies of OER fall. These domains are
the Business Knowledge and Leadership and Management Knowledge Domains. Figure 2 shows
that 42% of the competencies are Leadership and Management Knowledge related and the remain-
ing 58% are Business Knowledge related. The specific competencies and the number of people in
OER possessing them are shown in Table 2. The last competency in Table 2, the NASA Leadership
Competency, is further broken down into four subgroups, as seen in Table 3.
N Business Knowledge Domain
O Leadership and Management Knowledge Domain
Figure 2: Overall Competency Composition of the Mission Support Divisions of NASA OER
Only three of the competencies shown are either technical or technically related (the rest could





Education Programs and Technologies 2
Export Control 2
Governmental Affairs 6
Legal Application Practice: International Law 2
Public Communications and Outreach 2
International Program Development 25
Policy Management 2
Financial Management 2
Professional Administrative Operations 3
Para-Professional Business Operations 3
Leadership and Management Knowledge Domain
Executive Management 3
Business Work and Team Management 3
Project Work and Team Management 1
Technical Work and Team Management 1
Program/Project Management 2
NASA Leadership Competency 34
Table 3: NASA Leadership Competency Breakdown
Type Number
NASA Leadership Competency 33
Employee and Team Leadership 7
Knowledge and Communication Management 3
Work Performance Leadership 4
International Relations 19
roughly be grouped as technical aiding). In other words, only 1% of these competencies are tech-
nical and only 4% are technically related (see Figure 3). In this thesis, to qualify as a technical
competency, practical knowledge of a mechanical and scientific subject must be required. To qual-
ify as a technical related competency, only a theoretical technical knowledge is required. The only
technical competency is the Technical Work and Team Management competency. This competency
is described as knowledge, capabilities, and practices associated with individuals that must under-
stand and manage both the aspects of technical work, as well as management of employees and/or
teams. This competency requires the supervisor or lead to have the following competencies: Tech-
nical Management, Employee & Team Leadership, Work Performance Leadership. The Technical
Management competency includes the knowledge to manage technical activities during the life cy-
cle of projects that include: technical planning, requirements, management, interface management,
technical risk management, configuration management, technical data management, technical as-
sessment, and decision analysis [16]. The technical management process is one of the technical
sub-processes within the systems engineering approach as used by NASA [?].
4% 1%
0 Technical Related Competencies
* Tecimcal Competencies
* Non-Techmical Competencies
Figure 3: Technical Competency Composition of the Mission Support Divisions of NASA OER
The two technical related competencies are Commercial Technology and the Education Programs
and Technologies. The Commercial Technology competency is the knowledge and ability associ-
ated with transferring current and future NASA technology to external entities in order to meet
broad NASA vision and missions, and extend the life-cycle and broaden the usefulness of NASA
technologies. This competency also involves expertise in business practices pertaining to intellec-
tual property, patents, licenses and partnerships as well as general business knowledge for assessing
potential partners. A broad understanding of NASA's technologies and programs, as well as famil-
iarity with external entities and markets, are also needed [16].
The Education Programs and Technologies competency encompasses the knowledge, capabilities and
practices associated with the research and application of education programs, standards, require-
ments, activities and services relevant to the fields and disciplines of science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics (STEM) within the contexts of pre-college, higher education, and non-traditional
learning. A knowledge of education concepts and principles, curriculum development, infrastruc-
ture, audiences, instructional technologies and distance learning tools, and trends in order for NASA
to appropriately influence and contribute to national and state education initiatives and require-
ments through the use of NASA's unique assets, is needed. Furthermore, a knowledge of NASA
Enterprise and Center-based research and technology needs, and ability to align education activities
and programs with these needs, is also needed. Lastly, a knowledge of demographic and geographic
dynamics that influence the educational effectiveness and success within the various student and
educator communities, is also needed.
Pre-Interview Questionnaires
The educational backgrounds of the interview participants are shown in Table 4. Each degree ob-
tained is counted separately; for example, if someone has both a bachelors and masters in business,
it is counted twice. Additionally, if the degree fits into more than one category, such as international
business, it is counted twice (international studies and business). Table 5 shows the region of the
U.S. where the degrees were obtained. Once again, each degree is counted separately. Table 6 shows
the interest in returning to school and desired fields of study. See Appendix C for full data listing.





Public Policy Management and Administration 3
Foreign Language 4
Political Science 5
Sociology and Social Policy 3
History 3
Communications 1
Table 5: Region of U.S. Degree Was Obtained





Outside of U.S. 1
The NASA career summary of the interview participants can be seen in Table 7. Each inter-
viewee has been sorted by their career level. An interviewee serving between one and ten years total
at NASA is considered to be in the entry level career category. An interviewee having served 11 to
20 years total at NASA is considered to be in the mid-level career category. An interviewee having
served 21 years or more total at NASA is considered to be in the senior level career category. The
time spent as an international program specialist (IPS) includes time served as an officer represen-
tative at a partner foreign space agency.
The last few questions of the pre-interview questionnaire requested information regarding the train-
ing courses taken by the interviewees. The interviewee's opinion about the effectiveness of training
Table 6: Further Educational Goals
Do you plan to go back to What would you study?
school?
1 Maybe History or Law
2 Yes Accounting and Law
3 Yes Education or International
Relations
4 Yes No answer
5 No N/A
6 No N/A
7 Yes Business or Law
8 Yes Economics, International
Relations, Law, or
Engineering
9 Yes Astrophysics, Political
Science, or Law
10 In School: Chemistry/Biology Environmental Science and
Policy
11 Yes Not Sure
12 In School: Leadership Executive Leadership and
Development Organizational Learning
13 Yes Science and Technology Policy
Table 7: NASA Career Summary of Interviewees
Career Level Number of Total Years at Total Years as
Employees NASA an IPS
Entry Level (1 to 10 years) 8 41.5 25.5
Mid-Level (11 to 20 years) 0 0 0
Senior Level (21 or more years) 5 115 64.5
Total 13 156.5 90
courses were also requested. Table 8 lists only the training courses that were cited as either most
or least helpful and the respective given reasons. Other training courses or areas that were taken
but not considered to be most or least helpful are: Appropriations Law, Introduction to Technology
Transfer, Mission Operations Directorate Orientation, Legislative Affairs/Understanding Congress,
NASA Business Executive Program, Collaborating Internationally and Establishing International
Alliances, Masters in Business Administration crash trainings, Excellence in Government, Designing
Cost-Effective Space Missions, Dealing with Difficult People, Networking Know How: Make Your
Contacts Count, The Human Element, team building and leadership, negotiating, foreign countries'
public policy and resources, language training, personality training, and human capital management
training.
Interviews: Grounded Theory Coding Process
To reiterate, as described in the Chapter 3, the grounded theory coding procedure consists of the
following steps [18]:
1. Summarizing the raw data.
2. Separating the relevant data from the irrelevant data.
3. Identifying the repeating ideas.
4. Grouping the repeating ideas into themes.
5. Grouping the themes into theoretical constructs or hypotheses, and seeking literature to fill any
knowledge gaps.
6. Explicitly writing the hypotheses as related to the study's research concerns developed.
Steps Two through Six incrementally present the data analyzed in order to clearly demonstrate the
path to the development of the theories.
Step One: Summary of Raw Data
Step One of the coding process, the summary of the raw data, is presented directly below beginning
with an outline of the layout of the information.
Interview Raw Data Outline
1. Mission Directorate Support and Interaction with Partners
2. Writing Agreements
Table 8: Work Effective Trainings: Technical Relativity
Most Helpful Least Helpful Reasoning
Technical Hard Science or Math
Earth Science Technical X
Workshop
Introduction to Aeronautics X
Astronomy and Planetary X
Science for the Science
Professional
Foundations of Aerospace at X X "Some sections were less
NASA helpful to me than others"
Technically Related - Policy, Program/Project Management
Ground Operations Training X




International Program X X "I did not learn anything new"
Management
Other - Management, Leadership, Business Administration, etc.
Contracting X
Foreign Policy Program X
(Outside of NASA)
Program in Excellence X
Project Management Software X Information is not needed for
my job
Seven Habit and Principle X I did not apply the principles
Centered Leadership
Leadership for a Democratic X
Society
Generic Management Training X Principles taught are not
useful in normal government
circumstances
NASA Foundations of X Develops the leadership
Influence, Relationships, capabilities and inter-agency
Success, and Teamwork collaboration of NASA's
(FIRST) junior professionals by
providing increased awareness
of the NASA vision, mission,
and goals.
* Process of Writing Agreements
" Understanding the Technical Content
" Agreement Challenges
3. Working Relationship with Technical Experts
* Skills Required
" Skills Acquired
" New Employee Training
As a member of the OER team, an international program specialist has to be able to clearly and
efficiently communicate with other federal agencies, scientists and engineers (domestically inter-
nal and external to NASA and internationally). The IPS has to also communicate with senior
management; providing policy guidance to technical NASA officials regarding international issues.
Possessing political savvy knowledge is essential because an IPS is the expert on issues affecting
NASA in regards to the country they support. An IPS also has to be culturally aware to be able
to adjust to the nuances of cultural changes of the partners. OER is also tasked with aiding in the
implementation of the missions of the mission directorates, serving as a link between the mission
directorates and programs. Therefore, having a knowledge of NASA's programs and their history
is also essential. Furthermore, OER is not funded by a program and is not driven by incentives
to sustain the program and promote cooperation that may not be best suited to further NASA's
strategic goals. In serving as a link between the mission directorates and programs, an IPS is better
positioned to impartially serve and represent the interests of NASA.
In order to fulfill his or her duties, an IPS facilitates and organizes domestic and international
meetings and conferences. The meetings are to inform senior NASA staff of international travel
logistics (2) establish first contact with new international partners or establish ideas for new co-
operation with current partners, or (3) fulfill liaison work - communication necessary to maintain
cooperation and relationships. Liaison work also includes supportive attendance at partner events,
such as embassy or agency conferences. International travel logistics includes preparing briefing
books for each NASA official who will be traveling internationally to meet with a partner space
agency or government. The briefing books are comprised of all the relative information NASA se-
nior leadership will need while on international travel; information, such as meeting itineraries, and
lodging and transportation details. Most IPS stated that the preparation of the briefing books is a
huge commitment. According to one IPS, the amount of time spent on briefing books can take an
IPS two weeks to complete if also working on the weekend; however, it usually takes around three
weeks to complete.
Another aspect of an IPS' job is to negotiate agreements. When writing agreements, IPSs are
interested in answering the following questions: Is NASA getting a good deal? Would this coop-
eration be in line with NASA's interests? What parts do or can the partners actually play? How
much money and time do the partners actually have? Which skills do they have to contribute to
the project? There is a common process that most IPS go through to write the technical content
of their agreements. For most IPSs, there is an initial technical experts' meeting where the IPS
listens and takes notes as to what NASA's technical experts want. The IPS then drafts the tech-
nical component of the agreement and relies on the technical expert to fill in the specifics. Next,
the draft document is edited iteratively until the IPS feels the technical expert has explained the
technical content sufficiently enough in laymen terms. There are also challenges when writing and
negotiating agreements. Most challenges are a result of establishing new partnerships, agreement
process logistical roadblocks, and issues with partner's domestic political instabilities. The only
agreements cited as difficult because of their technical content were the International Space Station
(ISS) agreements, which are rich with technical details. In order to negotiate agreements, IPSs
have to understand the technical content of each agreement and work with scientists and engineers
(domestically and internationally).
When asked about the degree to which an IPS must understand the technical content, there were
various answers. There were some who answered that they must understand it completely. In other
words, an IPS is supposed to be able to regurgitate the technical information only on a general or
holistic level. However, it was well cited that the more an IPS understands, the better they can
strategically advise their customer. An IPS does not have to be an engineer, but some wish they
were because an IPS cannot write an agreement without understanding it. An IPS often meets
with other parties involved in the process of establishing an agreement, such as the Department
of State, where the technical expert is not present. As a representative of NASA, an IPS must be
able to explain the technical content. On the other hand, there were others who felt that they only
need to understand the technical content to little or no degree. For this reason it is possible for
an IPS to go without ever understanding the technical content. An IPS does not have to write the
technical portions of agreements. They can rely solely on the technical expert to write the techni-
cal portion of the agreement; editing and formatting it as necessary. The IPSs who feel this way,
believe this is part of the scientist's or engineer's job because, as an international expertise, the IPS
is supposed to help the technical experts write strategically and efficiently for the best of the agency.
The amount of time an IPS spends trying to understand the technical content varies by agreement,
person, project, and program. One IPS stated that 85% of their time is spent trying to understand
the technical content. Some methods of trying to understand the technical content include: asking
the "experts" questions until it is understood, visiting the mock-up of an instrument, vehicle, or
satellite if that is at the center of the agreement, engulfing oneself in the mission directorate and
listening in on technical experts' meetings involved in the agreement at NASA Headquarters. More
academic styles of methods include: researching on-line, reading the abstracts that the researchers
provide, collecting many publications, booklets, doing outside research, and training. Of these
methods, training is the one most supported and encouraged by NASA.
When asked about the daily working relationship with scientists and engineers, initially, some
IPSs felt the need to clarify that lumping scientists and engineers into one category was difficult to
do. One IPS explained that by experience scientists think in terms of gray and are generally more
open-minded in thought process and also open-minded to non-technical people playing a key role
on the team. On the other hand, engineers tend to think in terms of black and white and are not
open-minded to non-technical people playing a key role on the team. Some IPSs clarified that just
knowing someone's background gives you a hint as to how they approach a problem.
Frustrations due to differences in job objectives and communication issues with technical experts
were expressed. Generally the IPSs have experienced a relationship of mutual understanding with
the technical experts, where the experts appreciate the IPS's work and vise versa. Most of NASA
Headquarters' technical experts and the IPSs are mutually respective of each other. However, there
are cases where scientists and/or engineers feel that they are the true essence of the NASA work-
force and the IPS' job is to support their agenda. An IPS' job is to represent NASA's interests;
however, a principal investigator at a field center (PI) is mostly concerned with the success of his
or her project. They see OER's task requests as more bureaucratic work especially when they have
heavy workloads. Sometimes field center PIs will make collaborative promises with foreign partners
at international conferences, only to find out that the collaboration is politically illegal (not in line
with White House policies). This causes headaches for OER and IPSs. This is linked to another
point made about how NASA's field centers really do not know much about HQ's offices and pur-
poses. Regarding communication issues, some domestic scientists and/or engineers, although having
a great understanding of their work, can not communicate what they do in laymen terms. Further-
more, it is a separate level of understanding to communicate with techies from other countries who
do not speak English fluently (must overcome both a technical and cultural barrier). However, aside
from these few examples of frustrations, most experts have taken the time to understand that OER
desk officers do not have a technical background and most experts have a teaching mentality.
An IPS stated that about 30% of their time is spent in meetings with scientists and/or engineers.
However, there is a range of opinions about whether the reliance on technical experts has remained
the same, increased, or decreased over the time spent working as an IPS. Some IPSs feel that the
reliance has remained the same due to the consistency in the number of meetings. Others feel that
the reliance has decreased due to their increase in experience, responsibility, and knowledge. On
the contrary, the remaining IPSs feel that reliance has greatly increased due to (1) the increase of
the IPS' responsibilities and (2) the increase of technological political issues, which has led to an
increase in interactions with technical experts.
From the data above, one can began to see the skills required to be an international program
specialist (IPS). Table 9 lists the skills and abilities, in no order of importance, as described by IPS
themselves. Good communication skills, described as most important and key, includes good writing
skills (clear and concise) and verbal communication. The ability to understanding was described as
having the desire and the capacity to learn, as well as, having a genuine interest in the work that
NASA does (which is important to engage more knowledgeable counterparts). The international
relations work that IPS do can be done elsewhere (it is not specific to NASA); therefore, it is good
for them to have an interest in NASA in order to enjoy their work. This interest to some seems
imperative to office success. This interest will then enable IPSs to have general technical conversa-
tions with both international partners and NASA HQ scientists and engineers.











International program specialists cited that patience, persistence, and thoroughness is necessary
to ensure each party's collaboration desires are clearly expressed in the agreement (especially non-
English speaking partners). Research and analysis skills were said to include analyzing ambiguous
information and employing good note-taking skills. It is important to have the ability to follow
technical discussions and be able to translate that clearly. Critical thinking skills involves seeing
issues from the stakeholders' different perspectives and relate them to NASA's goals. Negotiating
skills consists of the ability bring to an agreement the different collaboration desires of two or more
diverse parties. In order to build and maintain relations, IPSs are constantly meeting new people.
It also requires cross-cultural awareness and respect and the ability to listen and dispel any prej-
udices. Interpersonal skills include the ability to know how to work with different personalities,
listen and respect others, and even go so far as to include recognizing when others are upset or what
upsets them. Any given individual may have the best education, resume, training, etc., but if that
individual lacks the ability to work well with others that is a big negative. Organizational skills
include planning meetings and trips, the ability to quickly multi-task, being flexible and adaptable,
time-management, efficiency, and to ability to prioritize.
There are also skills that can only be obtained on the job. IPSs with no technical background
have been learning from the world's leading aerospace and aeronautics experts to accomplish their
job. This takes great skill and the ability to understand the background or history of NASA's
programs. The IPS also has to employ strategic planning and thinking and have an understanding
of how the U.S. government works, how it makes decisions, and how the decisions are implemented.
This knowledge is essential to explain to foreign partners who may not understand the workings of
the U.S. government. It is also important for the IPS to have the ability to influence others on their
point of view and to be able to identify opportunities and argue effectively. If they are certain of
their point of view in a group meeting where the majority has mostly settled on an opposing idea,
wrong decisions could be made if that IPS is does have to courage to strongly state their case and
persuade the group.
These skills learned on the job do not come from an IPS new OER employee orientation because
such a program does not exist. On their first day of work, a new IPS will usually have their division
director and a veteran IPS to quickly present an overview of the office's policies, procedures, and
common practices. They will also be given a binder that contains an overview of the common pro-
cedures. It is worth noting here that this binder was assembled by an IPS out of the frustration of
having no employee orientation. As explained by OER management, an orientation program does
not exist because of a low turnover rate and constrained resources. For these reasons and the fact
that there are so few OER employees, the cost of an orientation program does not justify the cost
(to include both time and effort). An employee orientation is a huge time commitment. Most, but
not all, IPSs feel that they would have benefited from an orientation program. The new employee
experience was said to have been initially challenging and overwhelming. Others were okay with and
actually preferred having to learn by doing and asking. However, regardless of the perception of the
new employee experience, with time and experience all IPSs become acquainted to the office because
of learning by doing. One IPS stated that with each completed agreement there is improvement.
Feedback on current orientation practices is that the IPS reference binder is not complete and
sufficient for every IPS. An IPS's job portfolio (or official statement of job responsibilities) changes
every two to five years. No two IPSs' jobs are exactly the same, which makes a one-fits-all orien-
tation program difficult to implement. There are differences per division and per program. The
IPS' job is also dependent on the changes in the mission directorate they serve and the frequent
changes that come from the Office of the Administrator. It is hard to train people for these reasons.
The travel and logistical procedures, as set forth by NASA HQ or DOS, also change often which
contributes to the problem. The suggestions offered include: each division manager creating guide-
lines for each person coming in or hiring a separate individual that would do all the training (which
is costly). Additionally, some feel that having no new employee orientation may be a NASA-wide
problem. Other federal agencies have 6 week training programs that run about 40 hours per week.
There were suggestions for an NASA "Orientation 101" whose purpose would be to give an overview
of NASA. As previously stated, many centers do not understand how NASA HQ operates and vice
versa.
As stated previously, NASA encourages training for job enhancement, which has served and can
serve to orient new employees. The OER management feels that training introduces major topics
of concern for the mission directorates. For example, the NASA Academy of Program/Project &
Engineering Leadership (APPEL) training courses are very helpful; especially the training courses
in international project management. For one week, trainees are taught to understand budgets and
everything that goes into NASA's missions. It is very critical for the OER IPSs to understand how
the programs are put together in order to better support the mission directorate in which they
serve. IPSs are also introduced to technical terms and key people in the mission directorate in
which they serve. The OER management feels that these training courses are a great substitution
for an official OER new employee orientation. Furthermore, training outside of NASA HQ helps
the officers to see how a field center operates and the cultures that exist there. Most international
program specialists feel that training, especially technical training is helpful. However, the IPS'
workload is heavy. OER has lost approximately ten IPS job positions in the last past 10 years.
Therefore, for most, training is not a priority. In order to receive training, an IPS must make time
and also take the initiative.
Step Two and Three: Relevant Data and Repeating Ideas
In Step Two, there were only a few irrelevant points found in the raw data. These irrelevant
points are highlighted in Chapter 6, where future work is discussed. Presented here, in no order
of importance, is the work concerning the relevant data and the repeating ideas, ideas that were
mentioned by most interviewees, that has emerged from it. The repeating ideas are shown below:
1. An IPS must understand the technical content only on a general or holistic level. An IPS
cannot write an agreement without understanding it. An IPS does not have to be an engineer,
but some wish they were.
2. An IPS needs to understand the technical content to little or no degree. An IPS does not
have to write the technical portions of agreements. This is part of the scientist's or engineer's
job because, as an international expertise, the IPS is supposed to help the technical experts
write strategically and efficiently for the best of the agency.
3. Some methods of trying to understand the technical content include: asking the experts
questions until it is understood, engulfing oneself in the mission directorate and listening in on
technical experts' meetings involved in the agreement at NASA Headquarters, and conducting
on-line research.
4. Generally the IPSs have experienced a relationship of mutual understanding with the NASA
HQ technical experts, where the experts appreciate the IPS's work and vice versa. Most
experts have taken the time to understand that OER desk officers do not have a technical
background and most experts have a teaching mentality.
5. International travel logistics; briefing books are a huge commitment.
6. Most agreement challenges are a result of establishing new partnerships, agreement process
logistical roadblocks, and issues with partner's domestic political instabilities.
7. An IPS has to be able to clearly and efficiently communicate with other federal agencies,
scientists, and engineers.
8. The most important skills quoted were: communication, writing, analytical, critical thinking,
building/maintaining relationships, interpersonal and organization skills.
9. An IPS serves as a link between the mission directorates and programs.
10. IPS also establishes first contact with new international partners or establishes ideas for new
cooperation with current partners.
11. The NASA Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership (APPEL) training courses
are very helpful.
12. Most international program specialists feel that training, especially technical training is help-
ful. IPS workload is heavy.
13. The new employee experience was said to have been initially challenging and overwhelming.
Most, but not all, IPSs feel that they would have benefited from an orientation program.
However, no two IPS jobs are exactly the same, which makes a one-fits-all orientation program
difficult to implement.
In analyzing the relevant raw data for repeating ideas, insightful data - an idea mentioned by a just
one or a few IPS - were found. Therefore, these insightful ideas were simultaneously collected and
merged with the repeating ideas to for the themes of Step Four. These insights are listed below, in
no order of importance:
1. The amount of time an IPS spends trying to understand the technical content varies by
agreement, person, project, and program.
2. Reliance on technical experts has greatly increased due to (1) the increase of the IPS' respon-
sibilities and (2) the increase of technological political issues, which has led to an increase in
interactions with technical experts.
3. An IPS' job is to represent NASA's interests; however, a principal investigator at a field center
(PI) is mostly concerned with the success of his or her project, especially when they have heavy
workloads, and see OER's task requests as more bureaucratic work. This is linked to another
point made about how NASA's field centers really do not know much about HQ's offices and
purposes.
4. The only agreements cited as difficult because of their technical content were the International
Space Station (ISS) agreements, which are rich with technical details.
5. An IPS also has to be culturally aware to be able to adjust to the nuances of cultural changes
of the partners.
6. Any given individual may have the best education, resume, training, etc., but if that individual
lacks the ability to work well with others that is a big negative.
7. An IPS must have a genuine interest in the work that NASA does. The international relations
work that IPS do can be done elsewhere (it is not specific to NASA); therefore, it is good for
them to have an interest in NASA in order to enjoy their work.
8. An IPS must have the ability and capacity to understand is important. IPSs with no technical
background have been learning from the world's leading aerospace and aeronautics experts to
accomplish their job.
9. OER is not funded by a program and is not driven by incentives to sustain the program
and promote cooperation that may not be best suited to further NASA's strategic goals. In
serving as a link between the mission directorates and programs, an IPS is better positioned
to impartially serve and represent the interests of NASA.
10. The OER management feels that the APPEL courses in International Project Management
are a great substitution for an official OER new employee orientation.
11. As explained by OER management, an orientation program does not exist because of a low
turnover rate, constrained resources, and the fact that there are so few OER employees.
Step Four: Themes
The grouping process used to create the themes is described in Chapter 3, Analysis Procedures. In
order to be transparent about the logical reasoning behind the grouping of the repeating ideas and
insights, each theme's title describes the conceptual basis for its creation. The themes, presented
below, are in order of their establishment, not in order of importance.
1. The perception of technical competence.
(a) An IPS must understand the technical content only on a general or holistic level. An
IPS cannot write an agreement without understanding it. An IPS does not have to be
an engineer, but some wish they were.
(b) An IPS needs to understand the technical content to little or no degree. An IPS does
not have to write the technical portions of agreements. This is part of the scientist's
or engineer's job because, as an international expertise, the IPS is supposed to help the
technical experts write strategically and efficiently for the best of the agency.
2. The nature of and the methods of understanding technical content.
(a) The amount of time an IPS spends trying to understand the technical content varies by
agreement, person, project, and program.
(b) Some methods of trying to understand the technical content include: asking the experts
questions until it is understood, engulfing oneself in the mission directorate and listening
in on technical experts' meetings involved in the agreement at NASA Headquarters, and
conducting on-line research.
(c) Reliance on technical experts has greatly increased due to (1) the increase of the IPS'
responsibilities and (2) the increase of technological political issues, which has led to an
increase in interactions with technical experts.
3. The working relationship of the international relation specialist (IPS) and the technical expert.
(a) Generally the IPSs have experienced a relationship of mutual understanding with the
NASA HQ technical experts, where the experts appreciate the IPS's work and vice versa.
Most experts have taken the time to understand that OER desk officers do not have a
technical background and most experts have a teaching mentality.
(b) An IPS' job is to represent NASA's interests; however, a principal investigator at a field
center (PI) is mostly concerned with the success of his or her project, especially when
they have heavy workloads, and see OER's task requests as more bureaucratic work.
This is linked to another point made about how NASA's field centers really do not know
much about HQ's offices and purposes.
4. The major work issues that exist for the IPS.
(a) International travel logistics; briefing books are a huge commitment.
(b) Most agreement challenges are a result of establishing new partnerships, agreement pro-
cess logistical roadblocks, and issues with partner's domestic political instabilities.
(c) The only agreements cited as difficult because of their technical content were the Inter-
national Space Station (ISS) agreements, which are rich with technical details.
5. The skills and abilities critically important to an IPS' job.
(a) An IPS has to be able to clearly and efficiently communicate with other federal agencies,
scientists, and engineers.
(b) The most important skills quoted were: communication, writing, analytical, critical
thinking, building/maintaining relationships, interpersonal and organization skills.
(c) An IPS also has to be culturally aware to be able to adjust to the nuances of cultural
changes of the partners.
(d) Any given individual may have the best education, resume, training, etc., but if that
individual lacks the ability to work well with others that is a big negative.
(e) An IPS must have a genuine interest in the work that NASA does. The international
relations work that IPS do can be done elsewhere (it is not specific to NASA); therefore,
it is good for them to have an interest in NASA in order to enjoy their work.
(f) An IPS must have the ability and capacity to understand is important. IPSs with no tech-
nical background have been learning from the world's leading aerospace and aeronautics
experts to accomplish their job.
6. The critical elements of an IPS' job.
(a) An IPS serves as a link between the mission directorates and programs.
(b) IPS also establishes first contact with new international partners or establishes ideas for
new cooperation with current partners.
(c) OER is not funded by a program and is not driven by incentives to sustain the program
and promote cooperation that may not be best suited to further NASA's strategic goals.
In serving as a link between the mission directorates and programs, an IPS is better
positioned to impartially serve and represent the interests of NASA.
7. Helpful on-the-job training options for the IPS.
(a) The NASA Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership (APPEL) training
courses are very helpful.
(b) Most IPSs feel that training, especially technical training is helpful. However, the IPS
workload is heavy.
8. The elements of the IPS new employee orientation.
(a) The new employee experience was said to have been initially challenging and overwhelm-
ing. Most, but not all, IPSs feel that they would have benefited from an orientation
program. However, no two IPS jobs are exactly the same, which makes a one-fits-all
orientation program difficult to implement.
(b) As explained by OER management, an orientation program does not exist because of
a low turnover rate, constrained resources, and the fact that there are so few OER
employees.
(c) The OER management feels that the APPEL courses in International Project Manage-
ment are a great substitution for an official OER new employee orientation.
Step Five and Six: Theoretical Constructs and Theoretical Narratives
The same grouping process used to create the themes was used to create the theoretical constructs
or the concepts developed to support the hypothetical bases for future theory development. How-
ever, there are two themes that have been used twice because they related strongly to other themes.
The concepts, shown below, are given subjects to represent the relationship between the consti-
tuting themes. Following the theoretical constructs, the theoretical narratives explicitly state the
hypotheses as supported by details of the concepts.
The first concept is centered around the new IPS employee orientation and the OER employee
training and development experiences. The themes forming this concept are:
1. The skills and abilities critically important to an IPS' job.
2. Helpful on-the-job training options for the IPS.
3. The elements of the IPS new employee orientation.
Hypothesis 1: An evaluation of the current IPS orientation process and OER training procedures
may show that, despite perceived difficulties, are the best available.
On a search to gain insight into the IPS' technical competence, it was discovered that there is
frustration concerning the new IPS employee orientation and the OER. employee training and de-
velopment. It appears that OER aims to hire people with personality traits, skills, and/or abilities
that have been said are hard to learn or teach. Then once hired, the current orientation process
is brief, lasting one to two (lays. During this time the IPS is given a brief NASA/OER overview,
introduced to a fraction of the people with whom they will work, and is handed a binder to read.
Over the course of their first year, the IPS will learn how to do their job mostly by trial-and-error
and also by consulting office veterans. As explained by OER management, an official orientation
program does not exist because of a low turnover rate, constrained resources, and the fact that there
are so few OER employees. Therefore, during this first year, and this is to be true over their tenure
as an IPS, they are encouraged to seek training. However, the new IPS is occupied with learning
how to do their job and the veteran IPS is swamped with the workload of two IPS, such that train-
ing - in most cases - takes a back seat. This inability to properly take advantage of much needed
training is the source of most IPSs frustration. An outright revamp of the orientation and training
procedures is not the best primary action to be taken. There are outside factors to consider, such
as HR limitations to the number of IPSs in OER.. Therefore, an evaluation analysis of the current
orientation process would help to determine whether or not OER should change its orientation and
training practices.
The second concept addresses the role of the IPS and the interaction between the IPS and the
technical expert. The themes constituting this concept are:
1. The critical elements of an IPS's job.
2. The major work issues that exist for the IPS.
3. The working relationship of the international relation specialist (IPS) and the technical expert.
Hypothesis 2: An increased understanding of the IPS's role, on behalf of the technical experts -
especially the field experts, should improve the relationship of the IPS and the technical expert.
On a search to gain insight into the IPS' relationship with the technical expert, the role of the
IPS and the interaction between the IPS and the technical expert were observed. It was discov-
ered that the essence of what an IPS does is to serve as a link between the mission directorates
and programs, establish first contact with new international partners, and establish ideas for new
cooperation with current partners. It was also discovered that the IPSs more than likely will have
a relationship of mutual understanding with the NASA HQ technical experts; however, this is more
than likely not true with a principal investigator at a field center. This is partly because each
party has different motives and there is a lack of understanding about HQ's offices and purposes.
Therefore, it appears that the interaction between the IPS and the technical expert would be better
at NASA HQ than with a PI at a field center.
The third, and last, concept addresses the process of technical comprehension, using the following
themes:
1. The perception of technical competence.
2. The nature of and the methods of understanding technical content.
3. The skills and abilities critically important to an IPS' job.
4. The working relationship of the international relation specialist (IPS) and the technical expert.
Hypothesis 3: The technical competence of an IPS is, to some degree, dependent on both (1) the
working relationship an IPS has with the technical expert and (2) the IPS' capability, capacity, and
desire to learn.
On a search to gain insight into how the IPSs go about writing the technical content of agree-
ments, the process of technical comprehension was discovered. The amount of time an IPS spends
trying to understand the technical content varies by agreement, person, project, and program. Even
though IPSs disagree about the extent of their technical competence, it is clear that their reliance
on technical expertise is increasing. So much that the technical competence of an IPS is, to some
degree, dependent on the working relationship an IPS has with the technical expert because the IPS
main source of technical content clarification is provided by the technical expert. If the working re-
lationship is good, then the IPS ideally should have no problem understanding the technical content;
however, if the working relationship is bad, then the IPS will have to work harder to understand the
technical content.
Chapter Summary
The competency and pre-interview questionnaire data are used as supporting data for the grounded
theory coding process of the interview data. The two domains in which the competencies of OER
fall are in the Business Knowledge and Leadership and Management Knowledge Domains. 42%
of the competencies are Leadership and Management Knowledge related and the remaining 58%
are Business Knowledge related. Only 1% of these competencies are technical and only 4% are
technically related. According to the pre-interview responses, the majority of IPS have had formal
educational training in international studies and/or business (see Table 4). As shown in Table 5,
the training more than likely has taken place at a southern or western U.S. university. Regarding
the desire for IPS to return to school, of the eight IPS interested, two technically related degrees
and two technical degrees were mentioned by IPS as degrees of choice (see Table 6). Furthermore,
one of the two IPS currently in school is taking hard science courses.
The pre-interview data also contains the NASA career summary of the interview participants (in
number of years served) can be seen in Table 7. No mid-level career IPSs, having served 11 to 20
years, were interviewed. Most of the IPSs interviewed are considered entry-level, having served one
to ten years; however, the bulk of the years in experience come from the senior-level IPS or division
director interviewed. The last of the pre-interview questionnaire data are about training. As shown
in Table 8, half of the business, management, or leadership type training courses cited, 4/5 of the
technically related training courses cited, and 3/4 of the technical training courses cited were valued
as most helpful to the IPS' job.
Step one of the grounded theory coding process for the interview data, the summary of the raw data,
is presented in a form detailing the IPS job experience. Step two of the process highlights only the
relevant data and the repeating ideas that have emerged from it. The irrelevant data are discussed
in Chapter 6. In the process of analyzing the relevant raw data for repeating ideas, insightful data
- not qualifying as a repeating idea - were found. This insightful data was simultaneously collected
and combined with the repeating ideas to form themes. The themes, in turn, were grouped to create
the theoretical constructs or the concepts developed to support the hypothetical bases for future
theory development.
As a result of the grounded theory coding process, three hypotheses for further research were
formed: An evaluation of the current IPS orientation process and OER training procedures may
show that, despite perceived difficulties, are the best available; An increased understanding of the
IPS's role, on behalf of the technical experts - especially the field experts, should improve the rela-
tionship between the IPS and the technical expert; The technical competence of an IPS is, to some
degree, dependent on (1) the working relationship an IPS has with the technical expert and (2) the
IPS' capability, capacity, and desire to learn.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
This chapter integrates the information presented thus far and answers the study's research ques-
tions. In answering the questions, the study's methodology is checked for its accuracy. This chapter
then builds upon the study and draws from literature, not previously presented, to prove the accu-
racy of the hypotheses drawn. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the study's limitation
and future work recommendations are made.
Method Validation: Thesis Question Answered
The thesis question, "What are the technical interactions of international program specialists at
NASA's Office of External Relations?" is answered here. As explained in Chapter 3, the method's
validity check is in the comparison between the research concerns and the hypotheses drawn. If
the comparison shows that the two are related, then the methodology is valid. This comparison is
included in the answers to the sub-thesis questions poised in Chapter 1. Therefore, the overarching
question is answered through the presentation of the comparison.
What is the IPS's working relationship with scientists and engineers?
This question was poised to identify the dynamics of the interaction between scientists/engineers
and international program specialists. The first logically perceived step towards establishing this
identification, was to identify the working relationship between the two parties.
It was found that the essence of what an IPS does is to serve as the link or liaison between the
mission directorates and programs, to establish first contact with new international partners, and
establish ideas for new cooperation with current partners. What enables the IPS to validly per-
form this duty is the fact that OER is not funded by a program and is not driven by incentives to
sustain the program and promote cooperation that may be damaging for NASA in the long term.
In serving as a link between the mission directorate and programs, an IPS is better positioned to
impartially serve and represent the interests of NASA. In serving in this liaison role, the IPS assists
NASA's technical experts, but also negotiates and mediates between these technical experts and
their collaborating partners.
After having identified the role of the IPS, it was found that the IPS is more likely to have a
relationship of mutual understanding with NASA HQ's technical experts than with the technical
experts at a NASA field center. This is because the technical experts themselves (at HQ or field
center) have different motives. A principal investigator at a field center (PI) is mostly concerned
with the success of his or her project. This is also the concern of HQ technical experts, but they
have a better understanding of the need for OER by being at HQ (where the overall goals of NASA
are easily perceived). Similarly, the separation of the IPS from the field expert attributes to the
field expert's lack of understanding about what OER does at HQ.
These findings, a derivation of the aforementioned working relationship research concern, have
directly contributed to the development of the hypothesis stating that an increased understanding
of the IPS's role, on behalf of the technical experts - especially the field experts, should improve
the relationship between the IPS and the technical expert.
How do IPS go about writing the technical content of agreements?
This question was generated to discover what an IPS does and how the IPS goes about it. The
study has found that an IPS does not have to write the technical portions of agreements. They
can rely solely on the technical expert to write the technical portion of the agreement; editing and
formatting it as necessary.
In discovering this, it was also found that the process of writing the technical content is heav-
ily tied to the condition of the IPS' working relationship with the technical expert, and the IPS'
technical competence. The IPS is not the technical expert relies on the expert for the technical
information and the insight into what the information means. If the working relationship is good,
then the IPS ideally should have no problem understanding the technical content; however, if the
working relationship is bad, then the IPS will have to work harder to understand the technical con-
tent. Furthermore, depending on the formal educational and training backgrounds of the IPS, the
process of understanding the technical content will vary. Other factors tied to the learning process,
are years of experience, educational background, and personal interest/motivation/work standards.
These findings, a derivation of the research concern to discover what an IPS does and how he
or she goes about it, have directly contributed to the development of the hypothesis stating the
technical competence of an IPS is, to some degree, dependent on (1) the working relationship an
IPS has with the technical expert and (2) the IPS' capability, capacity, and desire to learn.
What is the IPS' technical competence?
This question's purpose was to discover what an IPS knows and/or understands. According to the
pre-interview responses, there is indication that some of the most technically interested IPSs desire
formal technical education although the majority of the IPSs have only had formal educational
training in international studies and/or business prior to being hired as an IPS (see Table 4). In
support of this, the competency data collected proves that OER's employees do not have technical
competencies, as only 1% of the competencies are technical and only 4% are technically related.
This in turn is supported by the heavy reliance on the technical experts for technical content clari-
fication, which is another indicator as to lack of technical competence.
In the absence of their technical competence, IPSs look to training for job development, espe-
cially - as most IPSs feel - in the absence of an orientation program. Therefore, in gaining insight
into the IPS' technical competence, it was also discovered that there is frustration concerning the
new IPS employee orientation and the OER employee training and development. These findings, the
research concern to discover what an IPS knows and/or understands, have directly contributed to
the development of the hypothesis stating that an evaluation of the current IPS orientation process
and OER training procedures may show that, despite perceived difficulties, are the best available.
Validation and Implications of Hypotheses
Showing that the method is valid does not automatically guarantee that the hypotheses are also
correct. This section will look to other studies and literature related to the each of the hypotheses to
help (1) validate or disprove the hypotheses drawn, and/or (2) further elaborate on the hypotheses
generated in this study.
Training and Orientation
To be clear, training as used in this thesis is referring to knowledge taught to enhance performance
on the trainee's current job. Development is referring to the acquisition of knowledge prior to its
application. Orientation consists of ai organization overview, the work unit, and a summary of how
things are done and what matters [21]. A successful orientation program should 1) welcome the em-
ployee, 2) help the employee to understand the organization in a broad sense (vision, goals, culture,
history, vision for the future) and the policies and procedures, 3) explain what the firm expects in
terms of work and behavior, and 4) help the employee become socialized in the firm/organization's
preferred way of acting and doing things [22].
IPSs feel that the current orientation practices are challenging and overwhelming. Managers believe
that current practices are necessary, and that no official orientation program does not exist because
of a low turnover rate, constrained resources, too few employees, and the fact that no two IPS jobs
are exactly the same. This is the reason why employees are encouraged to seek the international
program training and others within the NASA APPEL program. However, contrary to what is
believed, there is an unofficial orientation program in existence. Approximately twenty-five percent
of the orientation practice consists of a brief introduction to resources, people, and infrastructure.
About 65% of the practice is comprised of veteran help with the remaining 10% representing learn-
ing by doing. However, these percentages only represent the first day or two on the job. It takes
IPSs a year before they are fully oriented to OER. The rest of the year the percentages change
to 5% manager help, 45% veteran help, and 50% learning by doing (to include taking initiative to
enroll in training courses).
Training, or in the case of OER - orientation, is not an expense, but an investment in the hu-
man capital of employees. Regardless of this fact, "one of the most neglected areas of training is
new-employee orientation [23]." A new employee's initial experience with an organization can have
a major effect on his or her career [23]. Managers and supervisors should also be aware of the
importance of their role in the career development of emerging professionals ages 18-25 [24], which
has a strong implication towards the importance of new employee orientation. When the supervisor
provides welcomed support to the 18-25 age group, this support is considered thoughtful because
this support helps these employees through life and career transitions particularly crucial to this
group [24]. "Unfortunately, managers' mindsets cause them to often be biased towards treating
financial and physical capital as more "real" than the intellectual capital embedded in their employ-
ees. That perspective, in turn, may lead to an underinvestment in human capital [25J."
However, in spite of these facts, an official orientation program may not be the best solution for
OER. Surveys from the American Society for Training and Development, show that 80% of what
employees learn on the job came from informal procedures (performance and working with veteran
employees) than from a formal training program [22]. Therefore, the first step in correcting a prob-
lem is to conduct an analysis of what needs to be done. But before an analysis is to be conducted,
it is wise to keep in mind that there is a great deal of error in measures of training. Both the
establishments and the workers agree that there is a great deal of informal training for newly hired
workers. The incidence rate of each type of training exceeded 70% and the mean number of hours
for each type of informal training was over 20 hours in the first weeks of employment. In contrast,
formal training measures had relatively low incidence rates than the mean hours of formal training
in the first 4 weeks [26]. Performance-based evaluation measures for training programs, such as
surveys, on their own are not necessarily a sound basis for evaluating investments in training. The
appropriate means of evaluating any particular form of human capital investment will depend enor-
mously on the specifics of the employee, the type of training, and the organization and its context
[25].
In assessing an orientation program, literature points out four steps to follow (assessment, design,
implementation, evaluation) [25]. This area of assessment is referred to as a training needs analysis
(TNA) [27]. A TNA examines whether training is the desired solution to determine, as much as
possible, how to design the training program and how effective training will be in its usage [27, 28].
There are three major areas of the TNA, the organization (organizational/context analysis), the job
(the work or task/job analysis), and the person to be trained (user analysis). The organizational
or context analysis examines broad factors, such as the organization's culture, mission, long- and
short-term goals, values, and structure are related to the external environment [28]. Furthermore,
this analysis would include an examination of documents, laws, and procedures used on the job
would be useful. The job analysis is the examination of the tasks to be performed on the job.
Here the job requirements, tasks, knowledge, skills, and abilities are identified. The user analysis
determines who needs training and to what extent based on the worker's performance and the "or-
ganization's expectations or standards 128J." In addition to these three fundamental analyses, an
employer could conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the return on investment (ROI) of training to help
identify effective training results in a return of value to the organization. However, when designing
or evaluating training programs, one should bear in mind that cost-benefit calculations concerning
human capital investments may be distorted because important benefits are intangible or long-term
in nature [25].
I believe that an evaluation of the current IPS orientation process and OER training procedures may
show that, despite perceived difficulties, are the best available is a valid hypothesis. Throughout the
study, there have been strong implications that the current practices not only serve the traditional
role of an orientation, but help to build a lasting relationship between the new and veteran IPSs.
Furthermore, I believe that the current orientation practice is a "sink or swim" concept, which may
be necessary to help the IPS establish their place within OER. Therefore, I feel that these assump-
tions establish this hypothesis as legitimate.
Interaction
There is a need for an interpersonal understanding between the technical expert and the international
program specialist, and interpersonal interaction can be improved with an increased understanding
of the role each party involves plays. Searching existing methods that could help to identify relation-
ship roles, the use of the Transactional Analysis (TA) was discovered. The TA is a psychotherapy
used to analyze the inter-relational transactions between people by characterizing the roles played
in the transactions as a parent, adult, or child 1271. The roles are defined in the quotation below.
The Parent role represents authority, tradition and the routine knowledge of how things
are done. The Adult role meditates between the Parent and Child parts of the person-
ality. Is represents mastery of skills and an objective, rational, data-processing kind of
approach to a situation. The Child role represents spontaneity, creativity, intuition and
pleasure [27].
TA literature shows that healthy transactions are those that are complementary, as in an Adult-
Adult interaction. An IPS-Technical Expert interaction can be used as an example to demonstrate
this. If a technical expert were to ask an IPS "Do you know the file of my C-175 cleared agreement
is?" that is considered an Adult agent - initiating - transaction. If the IPS says "It is in your mail-
box," this is considered to be an Adult response. However, if the respondent (IPS) were to say "Well
it can not have gone far, let's see if we can find it for you," this is considered to be an Parent response.
On the other hand, in a crossed transaction the respondent responds with inappropriate feelings
for an appropriate Adult response. So, if the IPS were to originally say, "How should I know where
your file is? You always blame me for everything;" it would be considered to be a Child response [27].
I believe that an increased understanding of the IPS's role, on behalf of the technical experts -
especially the field experts, should improve the relationship between the IPS and the technical ex-
pert is a valid hypothesis. I feel that TA could be used by researchers as a means of examining
and generalizing the roles that are played between IPS and HQ technical experts and IPS and
field technical experts. Once general roles are identified, steps for relationship improvement can be
recommended. The resulting information would be helpful to inter-professional work environments,
such as OER. Furthermore, this lack of understanding of the diplomat's role may not only be ap-
parent here in the relationship between the IPS and the technical expert, but apparent in the other
technical organizations where the method of diplomacy aiding science and technology is practiced.
Therefore, I feel that these assumptions establish this hypothesis as legitimate.
Technical Competence
Searching existing competence and learning literature, the assumption of formal education theory
was found. The theory simply says that measures of formal education are assumed to accurately
represent human abilities. However, the concept of formal schooling as an institutional process
ignores the inherent nature of learning as the acquisition of cognitive knowledge and abilities by
experience. In application, this theory is saying that it is necessary to consider that a worker both
learns as he or she performs a job [29]. This supports the fact that behaviors can change due to
learning. Such learning is known as incidental learning or learning that takes place unconsciously
[27]. However, learning requires arousal and motivation. The sole presence of arousal and motiva-
tion will automatically provide learning [27]. Therefore, as the hypothesis states, if an IPS has the
capability, capacity, and desire to learn, they will learn.
Two constituents of incompetence are the inability or the unwillingness to learn or change and
deficits in communication 1301. The inability or the unwillingness to learn or change can be linked
to an IPS with low job interests. Deficits in communication can be linked to difficulties in the
IPS-Technical Expert working relationship, where the IPS is dependent upon the technical expert
for technical content clarification. Using the incompetence definition as a model, the incompetence
of an IPS can be accredited to low job interests (arousal and motivation) and difficulties in the
IPS-Technical Expert working relationship. Therefore, I believe that the technical competence of
an IPS is, to some degree, dependent on both (1) the working relationship an IPS has with the
technical expert and (2) the IPS' capability, capacity, and desire to learn is a valid hypothesis;
and the new-found definition of the incompetence of an IPS helps to establish the hypothesis as
legitimate.
Final Thoughts
In discovering the technical interactions of IPSs and technical experts, one can see that the use of
the method of diplomacy aiding science is rarely used and even more rarely documented or studied.
This may be the reason for the lack of understanding on behalf of the technical expert as to the
role the diplomat is to play. Furthermore, the lack of understanding of the diplomat's role may not
only be apparent here in the relationship between the IPS and the technical expert, but in the other
technical organizations where the method of diplomacy aiding science and technology is practiced.
It is hoped that the results of the study has presented information to help better the communica-
tion and relationship between NASA's diplomats and technical experts, found evidence of general
diplomat-technical expert behavior for further research, and provided inspiration for diplomats and




A review of current literature identifies that there are two major methods in which science and
technology are represented in diplomacy: the method of science aiding diplomacy and the method
of diplomacy aiding science, where science includes engineering, technology, the social sciences,
health, agriculture. The method of science aiding diplomacy is supported by extensive research,
and the method of diplomacy aiding science has no empirical support. With intentions to con-
tribute to the lack the latter, this study employed the hypothesis-generating grounded theory to
gain an understanding of the diplomat's technical competence and the diplomat's relationship with
the technical expert. The study, narrowed to the perspective of the diplomat written to address a
technical audience, examined as a case study, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of External Relations' (OER) diplomats - officially known as international program specialists
(IPS). IPSs were interviewed and the data was analyzed using the grounded theory coding process.
Statistics and charts were produced from pre-interview questionnaires and competency data and
used as supporting evidence for the interview data.
The thesis question, "What are the technical interactions of international program specialists at
NASA's Office of External Relations?", is expressed and answered through its three sub-questions:
What is the IPS's working relationship with scientists and engineers? How do IPSs go about writing
the technical content of agreements? What is the IPS' competence? The collective answer is that an
IPS does not generate the technical content of agreements, but relies heavily on the technical expert
for both the content and its clarification. This lack of technical competence is supported by the
fact that only 1% of reported OER's employees' competencies are technical (hard math and science)
and only 4% are technically related. Hypotheses developed through the grounded theory coding
process include: An evaluation of the current IPS orientation process and OER training procedures
may show that, despite perceived difficulties, are the best available; An increased understanding of
the IPS's role, on behalf of the technical experts - especially the field experts, should improve the
relationship between the IPS and the technical expert; The technical competence of an IPS is, to
some degree, dependent on both (1) the working relationship an IPS has with the technical expert
and (2) the IPS' capability, capacity, and desire to learn. The study's methodology was proven to
be valid through a demonstrated relation between the research concerns and the hypotheses drawn.
The hypotheses were validated by the support of current studies.
In discovering the technical interactions of IPSs and technical experts, it was observed that the
lack of understanding on behalf of the technical expert as to the role the diplomat is to play, may be
a result of the lack of research on the method of diplomacy aiding science. Furthermore, the lack of
understanding of the diplomat's role may not only be apparent in the relationship between the IPS
and the technical expert, but in the other technical organizations where the method of diplomacy
aiding science and technology is practiced.
Thesis Contribution
Contributions have been made to the lack of research concerning the practice of diplomacy aiding
science and technology. This was accomplished by first analyzing the diplomat's relationship be-
tween scientists and engineers. The thesis has discovered that there is a lack of understanding on
behalf of the technical expert as to the role the diplomat is to play. The overall study implies that
the lack of understanding of the diplomat's role may also be apparent in other technical organiza-
tions where the method of diplomacy aiding science and technology is practiced.
Limitations of Study
To be able to truly advance the research conducted on the practice of diplomacy aiding science,
there has to be an immense amount of data collected. The scope of this study has only allowed for
the examination of an element of the American science and technology diplomacy workforce, the
NASA Office of External Relations, to gain insight into the technical competencies and abilities of
diplomats and their working relationship with technical experts. At other organizations, the techni-
cal interactions between diplomats and technical experts will have other externalities (organization
culture, individual personalities, organization procedures and policies, etc.) affecting the technical
interaction between diplomats and technology experts. Furthermore, this study's data was collected
from the interviews of IPSs and the thesis written to address a technical audience. Therefore, the
hypotheses derived are heavily weighted to reflect the IPS' perspective.
Future Work
Further research should examine the diplomat-technical expert relationships at other organizations
within the American S&T workforce that practice the method of diplomacy aiding science. This
would to add other dimensions of the understanding to the American diplomat-technical expert
relationship. Further research should also conduct studies from the technical expert's perspective.
This would add even further dimensions of the understanding to the American diplomat-technical
expert relationship. It is not until a more complete perspective is gained that research in this field
can begin to focus on determining if convincing evidence exists that the lack of diplomats' technical
knowledge and/or existing relational difficulties between the diplomat and the technical expert have
negative effects on international agreements.
Other areas of interest for further research include:
1. Whether or not potential employees with interdisciplinary formal educations (a
combination of international relations, policy, engineering or science) would be
ideal candidates for the role of the IPS.
2. Which of the OER mission-support divisions rely more on technical expertise? Which of these
divisions have gained a deeper understanding of the technical content in which they deal?
3. Should OER concentrate on hiring certain personality types that will be okay with the no
official orientation tradition (personalities that thrive and can succeed with diving into the
deep end on day one)? What is the measure of success of IPSs who work best by learning?
Maybe OER, should look for these individuals in recruitment as opposed to establishing a new
employee orientation program?
Also, as aforementioned in Chapter 4, the irrelevant data separated from the data relevant to the
study's research concerns are presented here for further analysis. In other words, these data - al-
though collected for this study, were not folded into the research. Below the data is presented in
the form of short statements that readers can use as motivation for further research.
Training data for further research: It was found that some IPSs feel that having no new employee
orientation may be a NASA-wide problem. Other federal agencies have 6 week training programs
that run about 40 hours per week. A suggestive solution is the implementation of a NASA "Orien-
tation 101" program, the purpose of which would be to give an overview of NASA. This would also
help to address the fact that many centers do not understand how certain offices within NASA HQ
operate.
Other skills and abilities considered: The IPS has to be able to employ strategic planning/thinking
and have an understanding of how the U.S. government works, how it makes decisions, and how
theses decisions are implemented. This knowledge is essential to explain to foreign partners who
may not understand the workings of the U.S. government. It is also important for the IPS to have
the ability to influence others on their point of view and to be able to identify opportunities and
argue effectively. Another ability an IPS should possess is the ability to stand firm on great ideas. If
the IPS are certain of their point of view in a group meeting, where the majority has mostly settled
on an opposing idea, wrong decisions could be made if that IPS does have to courage to strongly
state their case and persuade the group.
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Appendix A: Pre-Interview Questionnaire
1. What post-secondary degree/s do you have? In what disciplines? (spell out disciplines)
2. From where did you receive the degree/s? (spell out names)
3. Do you desire to go back to school or are you currently in school?
4. If so, what degree and in what field would you or are you pursuing?
5. What has been your career path at NASA (please state the job position title and the number of
years you held that position)?
6. Have you had training workshops during your career? If so, please list the names of the training
programs, spelling out any abbreviations.
7. Which of these training workshops have been MOST helpful in improving your job performance?
8. Which of these training workshops have NOT been helpful in improving your job performance?
Appendix B: Interview Questions
Understanding the Skills/Abilities of the Job
1. What are the main duties/requirements of your job?
2. What skills and or abilities have served you well on this job?
3. Amongst these skills, how would you rank them from most important to the least important?
4. Are there any skills that can only be obtained by on the job experience?
5. How do you feel about there being no official new OER employee training? Why do you think
there is no new employee training?
Understanding the Interaction with the Technical Content of Agreements
6. To what degree, if any, are you required to understand the technical content of the agreements
on which you work?
7. How do you go about understanding or working with the technical content of the agreements on
which you work?
8. How often do you spend attend internal meetings with scientists and engineers? What are the
general purposes for these meetings?
9. Do you spend more time in these meetings now then when you first began here as an IRS or did
you spend more time in meetings in the beginning?
10. Would you say that you rely more, less, or about the same on scientists/engineers than when
you first began as an IRS?
Personal Technical Challenges/ Real Examples
1. What was the most challenging agreement on which you have worked? Why or why not would
you say this agreement was your most challenging? Was it challenging because of the technical
content?
2. In what ways did the office support you in any of the challenges you have mentioned?
3. How would you characterize your working relationship with scientists and/or engineers?
4. What types of difficulties (Do you have difficulties in communicating with Engineers/Scientists?
Do they have difficulties in communicating with you?
Appendix C: Educational Background's Raw Data
LIST OF DEGREES
MA in International Relations, BS in Sociology, MS in Social Policy, MBA, MA in International
Transactions, MPA (Public Administration), BA in Political Theory and Constitutional Democ-
racy,MA in Political Science, MPM (Public Policy/Management and Financial Management), BA
in History, BA in International Relations,MA in History, BS in Business, MA in Asian Languages
and Cultures, BA in International Studies, BA in Economics, MBA in International Business, MA in
German and European Studies (International Business), International Executive MBA, Philosophy
European Studies BA in German (History/Political Science), MA in Public Policy and Manage-
ment, BA in Chinese and Political Science, BA in Political Science (Sociology), MA East Asian
Languages and Literature, BA in Communications Studies, MA in International Policy Studies fo-
cus Non-Proliferation and Conflict Resolution, PhD in History (American Foreign Relations), MA
in International Economics and Japanese Studies, BA in International Relations
LIST OF SCHOOLS
University of Maryland, University of Notre Dame, University of Rhode Island, Cornell Univer-
sity, University of Oregon, Georgetown University, George Washington University, University of
California - Irvine, University of Connecticut, Colorado College,Colorado State University/Pueblo
University of Colorado -Denver, University of California- LA, George Mason University, University
of Cambridge, Washington College, Michigan State University, Rutgers University, American Uni-
versity, Northeastern University, England Mount Union College, Monterey Institute of International
Studies, California State University - Long Beach, John Hopkins: School of Advanced International
Studies, The Ohio State University
